Auctions in which losers set the price

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APA 6th ed. Note: Citations are based on reference standards. Weber, Lopomo, Giuseppe, Giuseppe Lopomo, Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.

Parlour, Christine A. Most related items These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one. Lorentziadis, Panos L. Elbittar, Alexander, Alexander Elbittar, Li, Yunan, Kaplan, Todd R. Ronald M. Harstad, Bulow, Jeremy I. In the equilibrium of a k-th price auction with or without rationing a bidder must bid above his value estimate conditional on being tied with the winner.

Testing experimentally this conjecture and the other theoretical results concerning k-th price auctions could lead to interesting new insights about the predictive power of Bayesian Nash equilibrium theory. We need to show that when all other bidders bid truthfully in the pt -auction, it is optimal for bidder 1 also to bid truthfully. This completes the proof. Proof of Proposition 3. One can show e. This gives the bidding function. Proof of Proposition 4. Robust Mechanism Design.

Econometrica 73, Bulow, J. Rand Journal of Economics, 33 1 , Harstad, R. Lottery Quali…cation Auctions. In Baye, M. Kagel, J. Econometrica 55, Economic Journal , Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.

Klemperer, P. Auctions: Theory and Practice. Krishna, V. Auction Theory. Academic Press, San Diego. Journal of Economic Theory 72, Lopomo, G.

Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction. Games and Economic Behavior 36, Econometrica 49, In Bewley, T. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Milgrom, P. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding. Econometrica 50, Multiple equilibria in asymmetric first price auctions auctions ; however, with the additional assumption that a buyer never bids above his value see Lebrun, , and Maskin and Riley, Although in each of these additional equilibria no buyer wins with a bid above his value, the allocation of the object and the selling price vary among the equilibria.

These additional equilibria are closely related to equilibria in an environment with a minimum bid where buyers do not bid above their values. He focused on the coordination of equilibrium choice when multiple equilibria exist. Tan and Yilankaya considered the same problem as in Campbell by assuming bid- ders are asymmetric in the sense that they have different valuation distribution functions while maintaining identical participation costs. Entry Deterrence in Dynamic Second-Price Auctions Third, note that our construction relies on the assumption that new entrants have enough information to compute the number of bids that are weakly greater than the current price.

In real-time auctions , no two bids can be timed to arrive at precisely the same time, so that the number of such bids cannot exceed two at any point in time.

Instead, there may be several agents who submit similar bids in sequence. Within the context of our discrete-time model, these bidders can be regarded as players who make the same bid in the same period. This allows each a new entrant to estimate the number of unique bidders who placed incremental bids in the past, and thus the number of current participants whose valuations are above the current price.

Uninformative equilibrium in uniform price auctions I analyze the incentive for costly information collection in a multi-unit common-value uniform- price auction in which bidders submit demand functions. There are some bidders who have the option of receiving a costly signal of the unknown true value. There are also some bidders who face a prohibitively high cost of receiving a signal. This is true even if only a small proportion of bidders are informed.

The equilibrium is also the unique among symmetric equilibria. The purpose of this note is to show that so long as there are some uninformed bidders bidders who have a very high cost of information collection , even if there are a large number of bidders who face an arbitrarily small cost of information collection, there are equilibria in which no one collects information so long as the supply is large enough. I allow demand function bids, but the result would hold with unit demand as well, but with the additional requirement that the number of uninformed bidders rises as supply increases.

Sequential auctions with informational externalities and aversion to price risk : decreasing and increasing price sequences There are two main advantages of my formulation of the utility function u. The …rst is that it lends itself to a clean and novel interpretation of the behaviour of risk averse bidders. For example, consider a static, single-item, auction.

A simple intuition for why bidders that are averse to price risk bid higher in a …rst- price than in a second- price auction is that a …rst- price auction insures them against any price risk; price when winning is certain in a …rst- price and random in a second- price auction.

The standard explanation of revenue ranking with risk averse bidders is less transparent, having to appeal to the risk of losing the object. The second advantage of my formulation is tractability. The model with bidders that are averse to price risk yields pure strategy equilibria independently of the degree of aversion to price risk. Strategic Price Discounting and Rationing in Uniform Price Auctions These …ndings may reconcile the uniform price auction theory with empirical evidence.

Indeed, natural experiments about the Treasury auctions are not in line with theoretical predictions.